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JAMIE LONGAZEL 
UNDOCUMENTED FEARS 
Immigration and the Politics of Divide and 
Conquer in Hazleton, Pennsylvania 
IlffiiI TEMPLE UNIVERSITY PRESS 
r!I Philadelphia ~ Rome ~ Tokyo 
Introduction 
Immigration and the Politics 
of Divide and Conquer 
l1li III Nestled deep in the Pocono Mountains," began a segment of CBS's 
60 Minutes, "Hazleton, Pennsylvania, has the look and feel of an 
all-American town."] The first visual of the telecast is a glimpse of 
the city's landscape. 'lne screen then switches to images of smiling high 
school cheerleaders wearing red-and-white uniforms, walking down the 
street waving their pom-poms in unison. The viewer can hear the drum-
beat of a marching band. The narrator continues, "Most of the people who 
turned out for the town's annual end-of-summer parade are descendants 
of immigrants, including the mayor, Lou Barletta." 
"The Barlettas came from Italy," the voice specifies, "and ended up with 
a street named after them." We then see the mayor sitting atop the backseat 
of an antique convertible that parades him down the road. He waves to his 
constituents, who are all cheering him on. "Good job mayor! Way to go!" 
shouts one of his fans. 
Tne narrator then chimes in with the story's hook. "Now the mayor is 
making a name for himself by going after a different kind of immigrant." 
Above the still audible cheers from the crowd, you can hear another shout 
from a vocal onlooker: "Keep the illegals out!" The camera zooms in on the 
mayor, whose bright white shirt and red tie stand out against the empty 
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maroon-painted brick storefront in the background. He smiles, nods, and 
waves again. 
The scene then briefly shifts away from the parade to show a snip-
pet from an interview with Lon Barletta-''!'m going to eliminate illegal 
aliens from the city of Hazleton," he says-and just like that, we return to 
the jovial celebration. Now there is a tuba blaring, the crowd continues 
to cheer, and there is another picture of the mayor smiling and giving a 
thumbs-up. 
That portion plays on for a few more seconds before the celebratory 
sounds abruptly go silent. The visual changes over to a close-up of a clear 
glass door, presumably to a small grocery store. Hanging from the door 
is an advertisement handwritten in black marker on white poster board: 
"PLATANO Verdes 8 x 1.00." Someone wearing a dark red flannel shirt and 
blue jeans opens the door and walks inside. We cannot see a face; we see 
only a rear view of the person, from shoulder to calf. Over this image 
the narrator explains in more detail what motivated Hazleton's passage of 
the Illegal Immigration Relief Act (lIRA): "Barletta believes what's been 
going on in Hazleton is a microcosm of what's been going on all over the 
country: that illegal immigrants are overwhelming his city, draining its 
resources, and ruining the quality oflife." 
The Loea/Latino Threat Narrative 
This book has two primary aims. The first is to problematize how mis-
conceptions about Latina/o immigrants coupled with nostalgic collective 
imaginings of "Small Town, America," contribute to the construction of 
a racialized community identity that embraces exclusionary immigration 
policy. The powerful juxtaposition in the 60 Minutes telecast introduces 
this argument quite well. Celebratory music, imagery of cheerleaders and 
marching bands, allusions to tradition, and references to European immi-
grants who "made it" bolster the description of Hazleton as a place with 
the "look and feel of an all-American town." In sharp contrast, the broad-
cast speaks only briefly of a "different kind of immigrant'" depicted as a 
shadowy-indeed, jaceless3-figure that confronts unquestioned accusa-
tions of ruining what we are led to assume is an idyllic quality of life' 
The anthropologist Leo Chavez has examined the pervasive nature of 
such representations around Latina/o immigration, which coalesce into 
what he calls the Latino 1nreat Narrative. The taken-for-granted "truths" 
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that this narrative comprises, he writes, are that "Latinos are not like 
previous immigrant groups, who ultimately became part of the nation."5 
"Rather, they are part of an invading force from south of the border that 
is bent on reconquering land that was formerly theirs (the U,S, Southwest) 
and destroying the American way oflife,"6 
As locales across the United States take action against undocumented 
immigration,7 we see an extension of this familiar script. Thousands of 
Latina/o migrants arrived in Hazleton in the years leading up to the lIRA, 
and, as we will see, the story of what led them there is quite complex (see 
Chapter 1) and their experience is rich, lbe 60 Minutes report, along with 
other, similar descriptions, however, narrowly depicts an unlikely "hero" 
emerging to "stem the tide" as the so-called "problem" of undocumented 
immigration "seeps" into the interior and afflicts an "All-American town."B 
It will become even clearer as I trace the politics surrounding Hazleton's 
lIRA over several stages how tales of a harmonious small town in peril rep-
resent a local-level iteration of the nationalistic threat of reconquest that 
Chavez describes, Regardless of the geographic space it imparts to protect, 
the narrative remains characterized by strong assertions that "they" have 
arrived with the intent to harm "us." 
Part of my objective is to show how race permeates this narrative. I use 
two concepts to accomplish this: Latina/o degradation and White affirma-
tion9 By Latina/o degradation, I mean the subordination that accompanies 
the (often subtle, but nonetheless consequential) symbolic linking of nega-
tive traits to Latina/os, Although this debate begins as a backlash against so-
called "illegal aliens," cloaked race-neutrally as a defense for the rule oflaw, 
it will become apparent that exclusionary rhetoric about legal status is often 
simply an entry point for a discussion about larger racialized fears, Indeed, 
there are examples throughout the book of how this narrative extends its 
reach to encompass Latinas/os who are not undocumented immigrants. lO 
1here are also examples of how it is used to vilify pro-immigrant activ-
ists who resistY 1be narrative holds strong to the notion that traits such 
as criminality, fiscal burdensomeness, and a penchant for seeking "spe-
cial privileges" characterize "outsiders," even though these assumptions 
are grossly inaccurate,12 problematically narrow,13 and drawn from a long 
history of racism and nativism,!4 Quoting Lisa Marie Cacho, rhetoric that 
appears throughout this debate therefore constructs the undocumented 
and others by racialized association as "ineligible for personhood,"!5 What 
becomes taken-for-granted conventional wisdom is that "they" are perpetu-
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ally incapable of following the law, always undeserving of public services, 
and never entitled to legal recourse. Put another way, Chavez explains how 
degradation amounts to virtualization. Epitomized by the facelessness of the 
figure in the 60 Minutes report, "The virtual lives of 'Mexicans,' 'Chicanos,' 
'illegal aliens,' and 'immigrants' become abstractions and representations 
that stand in the place of real lives .... They are no longer flesh-and-blood 
people; they exist as images."16 It is in this context that it troublingly becomes 
acceptable to discuss "eliminating" a group of people. 
By White affirmation, I refer to the parallel process-that is, (again, 
non-explicitly) associating positive characteristics with Whiteness while 
asserting whom in particular the alleged "immigrant invasion" has harmed. 
Importantly, White affirmation works through Latina/o degradation. 
Because "whiteness is a relational concept, unintelligible without reference 
to nonwhiteness,")7 the defining of Latinas/os as inferior becomes a neces-
sary step in the construction of White superiority.1s Idyllic depictions of who 
"we" are-the cheerful parade, and so on-become more comprehensible 
when placed alongside assertions of who "we" are not. 19 Racialized binaries 
are apparent at each stage of Hazleton's immigration debate I explore: law-
breakers and law abiders; fiscal drains and hardworking people; separatists 
and egalitarians; neighbors who are noisy, messy, and careless and neighbors 
who are quiet, kempt, and careful. 20 
Beyond reinforcing difference and belonging, these binaries amplify 
the perception of the Latino Threat by specifying who is threatened. Repre-
sentations of "invaders," in other words, are used to construct the identity 
of the "invaded." Encapsulated in the notion of White affirmation is thus 
what Cacho has elsewhere referred to as the ideology of white injury.2) Even 
though it is Latinas/os and other people of color who endure degradation 
and confront institutional barriers because of their race, in this narrative 
Whites are continually constructed as victims of undocumented immi-
grants' criminality, as suffering because of "their" burdensomeness, and as 
treated unfairly by "efforts to remedy racial discrimination."" 
The Politics of Divide and Conquer 
The second aim of this book is to highlight how this narrative contrib-
utes to the perpetuation of social inequality at the intersection of race 
and social class. My thesis here is that, on one hand, Latina/o degradation 
enhances the exploitability of immigrant laborers and imposes limits on 
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meaningful resistance. On the other hand, White affirmation prompts an 
embrace of a White collective identity that not only degrades but also mis-
directs animosity and stunts the formation of class-based coalitions that 
could pursue economic justice. 23 
The history of U.S. immigration policy is largely an intertwining of 
economic exploitation and nativism. 24 In the particular case of immigrants 
from Latin America, U.S. officials have had a long history of calling on 
migrants when they needed them~during wartime labor shortages, for 
example-and forcibly removing them when labor demands subsided and 
anti-immigrant hostilities intensified.25 In the contemporary political eco-
nomic context, near-record numbers of immigrants are arriving in the 
United States.26 However, the vacancies they fill this time around are the 
result not of labor shortages but, rather, of "structural transformations."" 
Amid globalization and rapid technological change, jobs in sectors such 
as manufacturing are leaving the United States, and immigrants are filling 
the often temporary, low-wage employment opportunities that crop up in 
their place. Companies competing in the global economy doing all they 
can to cut costs have grown increasingly reliant on "inexpensive" immi-
grant laborers-many of whom have been uprooted from their home coun-
tries by the same processes, including especially the so-called free-trade 
agreements that leverage U.S. control over other national economies. 28 
In contrast to the American dream narrative, which suggests that 
newcomers who start at the bottom can work their way up, the reality 
of a system that requires so much low-wage work is that it thrives on the 
labor of the marginalized.'" When we realize that "exploitation can be 
more easily justified if the exploited are placed within a fixed hierarchy,"" 
Latina/o degradation emerges as an ideological tool that caters to such 
arrangements in the current historical moment. 31 While many reap the 
economic benefits of exploited immigrant labor, virtualization makes it 
harder to realize immigrants' place in the social structure and it belittles 
the various social harms that many who live their lives on the social, eco-
nomic, and legal margins confront. From this perspective, we can delink 
the presence of undocumented immigrants from the notion of "un secure 
borders." As Nicholas De Genova puts it, capitalists in a cutthroat global 
economy prefer "the continued presence of migrants whose undocument-
ed legal status has long been equated with the disposable (deportable), 
ultimately "temporary" character of the commodity that is their labor 
power."32 Because citizenship is often "visibly inscribed on bodies"33 and, 
6 Introduction 
as Kitty Calavita writes, "immigrants' position in the economy inevitably 
reproduces the visible markers of poverty, and further generates ... mate-
rial and social exclusion," many migrants who do have authorization also 
find themselves caught up in this web of marginality and exploitability. 34 
For poor and working-class U.S.-born \t\Thites such as those who make 
up the bulk of Hazleton's population, economic uncertainty also abounds 
under these conditions. The structural patterns that have attracted immi-
grants to places like Hazleton have also enhanced insecurity for many 
people accustomed to stable, decent-paying work. 35 For example, Hazle-
ton's Luzerne County has lost more than half of its manufacturing jobs 
since the late 1970s, with low-wage industries filling that void; temporary 
employment agencies seem to be popping up on every corner; and the city 
struggles with budget issues at the same time that many recently arrived 
firms are enjoying lavish tax breaks (see Chapter 1).36 In short, de-manu-
facturing, demographic shifts, and austerity are all of a piece. However, 
just as few openly or accurately discuss the role of immigrant labor in tbe 
economy, I show how what some have called "depoliticized neoliberal-
ism" (see Chapter 1) has helped conceal the relationship between these 
patterns, effectively removing them from the public debate. Individualistic 
assessrnents of economic circumstances predominate,37 for example, and 
acknowledgments of job quality rarely accompany boasts of job creation. 
This context provides fertile soil for the Latino Threat Narrative38 It 
plays Simultaneously to the powerful sentiments of those experiencing 
insecurity and mourning the economic decline of their hometowns and 
to negative assumptions about people of color that are so deeply embedded 
that many accept them even in the face of clear contradictory evidence. 39 
For this reason, part of this story is about pure political ambition. As an 
extension of the "Southern Strategy" launched by the Republican Party 
in the 1960s to attract racially aggrieved poor and working-class White 
voters," many politiCians have begun deploying racially coded rhetoric as 
they "[search] for electoral gold in warning about the Hispanic threat."" 
Electoral success accordingly follows the politician who can best depict 
himself or herself as tough on "illegal immigration," willing to "take a 
stand," "stem the tide," or "take back" "our" city or country. 
When the Washington Post interviewed Mayor Barletta about the lIRA 
in the summer of 2006, he commented, "I lay in bed and thought, I've lost 
my city. I love the new immigrants; they want their kids to be safe just like 
I do. I had to declare war on the illegals."42 These words concede that things 
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are not going well in Hazleton. The city is lost. Yet rather than provid-
ing cOlnmentary on how Hazleton should weather the economic storm, I 
argue in this book that this kind of rhetoric shifts the blame. Resembling 
what the legal scholar Ian Haney L6pez refers to as "dog whistle politics,"" 
statements such as this are at the heart of the Latino Threat Narrative, 
portraying people without documentation narrowly and inaccurately as 
posing a profound (i.e., requiring a declaration of "war") and urgent (i.e., 
"I had to") problem and draWing attention to the politician who is accord-
ingly prepared to lead the "fight." What makes this rhetoric especially 
powerful is that it is capable of withstanding any charges of racism that 
may arise-note here how race is never mentioned explicitly and how an 
expression of "love" for immigrants is sandwiched between the realization 
ofloss and the declaration of war. 
Ultimately, however, this is not a story about individual politicians." 
Undocumented Fears connects the proliferation of the Latino Threat Nar-
rative to a broader ideological project designed to divide and conquer poor 
and working people. While degradation assures the existence of exploit-
able immigrant laborers, affirmation encourages poor and working-class 
Whites to embrace their racialized rather than class-based identities. Akin 
to what some scholars refer to as a "racial bribe,"" the Latino Threat Nar-
rative in this way promises a symbolic uplift to those White workers who 
choose to ally with White political and economic elites instead of conspir-
ing with their fellow workers of color to protest their shared economic 
plight. Although it does little to improve their socioeconomic standing, 
the bribe is, and long has been, enticing for many, particularly at these 
moments of uncertainty, because it grants "public deference" and a "psy-
chological wage."46 Thus to paraphrase W.E.B. Du Bois, members of the 
White working class often become content with their class position once 
they come to see themselves, in this case, as "not Latina/o."47 
The ideology of White injury factors in here, as well. More than simply 
evoking race instead of class, the rigid "us" and "them" binaries in this narra-
tive reinforce particular understandings of socioeconomic relations. 1he poli-
tics I describe in this book use race to promote an individualistic worldview 
that attributes, quoting Katherine Beckett, "the plight of the average Ameri-
can" to people said to be "looking for the easy way out":'8 '''cheats,' 'thieves,' 
'freeloaders[,]'''49 and, in this case, "illegals." That is to say, my argument in 
this book is that the Latino Threat Narrative is embraced, at least in part, for 
its "capacity to explain the declining social and economic position of work-
!ntroduction 
ing people."" As opposed to concern about financial burdens imposed on 
workers, the understanding that has prevailed suggests that the behavior of 
racialized outsiders is economically injurious to Whites (e.g., '''Our' commu-
nity is destitute because 'they' commit crime and milk the system"). 
In short, the Latino Threat Narrative reconstitutes the terms of the 
debate, controlling what we see and what we do not in a way that allows 
existing hierarchies to remain intact. Degradation reasserts the subor-
dinate social and economic position of many Latina/os. Yet its color-
blind rhetoric masks racism, its virtualizing of real people "blunts the 
empathetic response/'51 and its scapegoating makes exclusionary policies 
appear justified. Mobilizing for immigrants' rights and racial justice in 
this context is therefore not surprisingly an uphill battle (see Chapters 3 
and 4). Existing economic arrangements that concentrate wealth in the 
hands of just a small number of people also avoid contestation by remain-
ing invisible to many. Working-class politics are drowned out along with 
the potential for class-based, cross-racial/ethnic solidarity as the prevail-
ing narrative depicts immigrants not as workers but as fiscal burdens and 
encourages working-class Whites to see themselves in contrast to such 
racialized representations. The "harm" that the Latino Threat Narra-
tive suggests vVhites experience as Whites in this way becomes the harm 
around which activists in favor of laws like the lIRA can successfully 
mobilize. Consequently, it is this problematic conception of harm that 
garners the lion's share of attention. What we end up with, I argue, are 
counterproductive, de-democratizing local-level mobilizations:" calls for 
additional state power and control over raCially marginalized populations 
and collective efforts that reinforce the market ideology responsible for 
perpetuating global and local economic inequality. 
Plan of the Book 
The book begins with an examination of how the structural arrangements 
I have just described filter down to the localleve!. In many nations striving 
to enhance their economic standing in the increasingly competitive world 
of global capitalism, immigrants are attracted for their inexpensive labor 
and subsequently demonized. 53 Domestically in tbe United States, many 
small cities and rural towns are also struggling to remain economically 
viable as their industrial base withers and they compete witb other locales 
to attract industry. Many communities in this situation are settling for 
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exploitative firms and, as a result, are attracting large numbers of immi-
grant laborers who, in turn, are subject to bacldash.54 
In Chapter 1, I provide an account of this by studying the history of 
Hazleton's primary community economic development group, CAN DO. 
This organization prOVides a window through which we can see how 
broader political economic forces have affected Hazleton. By tracing CAN 
DO's evolution from its founding in the 1950s, through the introduction 
of a market-centric ideology in the 1980s, and into the present, we hecome 
aware of the structural shifts that both created economic uncertainty 
among local residents and prompted Latinalo immigration to Hazleton. 
My analysis also suggests that CAN DO has responded to recent econom-
ic shifts and demographic changes with a depoliticized approach that is 
characteristic of the current political economic order. In short, Chapter 1 
documents the setting of the structural and ideological stage for the poli-
tics that ensue. 
Chapter 2 begins with a comparative analysis of the media coverage 
of two homicides committed in Hazleton. The first is a Latino-on-Latino 
murder that prompted calls for calm. The second is the killing of a White 
Hazleton resident, for which two undocumented Latino immigrants were 
initially charged. The second homicide prompted a moral panic and cata-
lyzed passage of the lIRA. This analysiS introduces us to how politicians 
and other City officials draw from the broader Latino Threat Narrative 
and mold it to fit the local context. In the reaction to the Latino-on-White 
homicide, the notion that "they" have harmed "us" and that we therefore 
must "get tough" is very apparent. That is not so in the case featuring a 
Latino victim. 
I follow the moral panic over the murder of the White resident into 
City Council debates, where it became the impetus for the introduction 
of the lIRA Here, I suggest clear instances of Latinalo degradation and 
White affirmation are on display. Officials extend the implications of this 
Single criminal incident with blanket constructions of undocumented 
immigrants as "crime-prone" and Hazletonians as potential innocent vic-
tims of their criminality. I show how officials also bring other issues in at 
this jnncture-claiming, for example, that immigrants are a drain on city 
reSOurces-as they construct what I interpret as an alternative explanation 
for Hazleton's economic decline. 
Chapters 3 and 4 explore how members of the community majority 
respond to various pro-immigrant efforts put forth by local Latina/o COill-
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munity leaders and their allies. The first of these chapters focuses on how 
the majority used a particular strand of the Latino Threat Narrative to 
fend off pro-immigrant mobilizations that directly contested the lIRA. In 
this version of Latino Threat, which is similar to what scholars have docu-
mented in other local contexts and emblematic of national immigration 
debates,55 we see Latina/o activists' efforts to claim discrimination and 
assert their rights dismissed by the majority as "inappropriate" evocations 
of race and "excessive" demands for "special rights." At the same time, 
the majority constructs its own rights claims and legal mobilizations as 
acceptable, even necessary, to ensure continued community harmony. 56 
Thus, the backlash to the initial protests by Latinalo community leaders 
quelled pro-immigrant mobilizations and added "self-interested," "reverse 
racist" activists to the list of those who supposedly pose a threat to a previ-
ously "harmonious" Hazleton. 
I also explore in Chapter 3 how these activists had a similar experi-
ence when they later turned to litigation, challenging the ordinance in the 
high-profile case Pedro Lozano et al. v. City of Hazleton (hereafter, Lozano 
v. Hazleton). Altbough pro-immigrant groups were ultimately victorious 
in court, the lawsuit and subsequent decision prompted some of the most 
vitriolic politics of the entire debate. Even in the shadow of the lIRA's 
defeat, we see how the conception oflocal Latino Threat further intensifies 
as "powerfullitigators" and "activist judges" face accusations that they, too, 
have undermined this "innocent small town." 
In Chapter 4, I examine subsequent pro-immigrant efforts-specifi-
cally, a volunteer coalition of Latinalo and White residents who mobi-
lized with the goal of building a bridge between recent immigrants and 
established residents and institutions. As an adaptation to the backlash 
the initial pro-immigrant mobilization faced, this group was able to make 
important progress by avoiding contentious issues. For example, some 
infrastructure is emerging to support immigrants, the issue of integration 
has gained visibility and positive press, and there has even been coop-
eration from some who previously championed backlash politics. In this 
respect, what we see is a pattern that mirrors a common refrain in national 
immigration debates: Things will get better as time goes on, and conflict-
ing groups are able to compromise. Remaining cognizant of how meaning-
ful these gains have been, but also questioning this uncritical assessment, 
I argue that here, too, the Latino Threat Narrative still looms large and 
that the debate remains on the ideological turf of those who sit atop racial 
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and economic hierarchies. Specifically, r point to several key politicallimi-
tations that activists continue to confront, including an ability to bring 
attention to the specific harms and burdens Latina/o immigrants endure, 
to directly contest the ideology of White injury, and to introduce class-
based politics into the debate. 
r conclude by recounting an example from Hazleton's history that I 
think takes on particular significance in light of these contemporary 
events. Back when it was a coal mining town, Hazleton was riddled by 
ethnic strife and labor-capital disputes. r argue that collective engagement 
with this history is but one tactic that has the potential to foster new com-
munity identities capable of resisting the politics of divide and conquer in 
Hazleton and beyond. As immigration law and politics localize, in other 
words, it becomes vitally important that we contest top-down construc-
tions of community identity that have their basis in racialized myths and 
economic distortions and replace them v<lith engaged, bottom-up activ-
ity that authentically and democratically confronts racial and economic 
inequality. 
114 Notes to tite Preface 
always depended on people who are standing independently and are able to 
have that lover's quarrel with something they love too much to let it sink to its 
lowest life form. So the empty self is a threat, I think, to fundamental demo-
cratic values and processes. (Parker Palmer, "Inner Authority and Democracy," 
interview, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xVmt7FouwGo.ac-
cessed March 21, 2015) 
20. Parker Palmer, interview by Bill Moyers, February 20,2009, available at http:// 
www.pbs.org/moyers/journal!02202009/transcript2.html, accessed December 22, 2014. 
21. Rita Hardiman and Bailey Jackson, "Conceptual Foundations for Social Justice 
Education," in Teachingfor Diversity and Social Justice, 2d ed., ed. Maurianne Adams, 
Lee Anne Bell, and Pat Griffin (New York: Routledge, 2007), 41. Feagin and Vera simi-
larly write about liberation sOciology: 
We call for the reassertion of a sOciological practice designed to empower ordi-
nary people through social science research and knowledge. By having better 
access to critical sociological knuwledge, people will be in a better position to 
understand their personal and familiallroubles, make better sense of the world 
we live in, plan their individual and collective lives, and relate in egalitarian 
and democratic fashions to others within and outside their own nation state. 
This includes being in a better position to struggle for indiVidual and collective 
human rights. A broad-based democracy can be fully developed in our era only 
ifkey types ofknowlcdge are made available to all, not just to those at the top of 
the socioeconomic pyramid and their professional servants. (Feagin and Vera, 
Liberation SOCiology, 10) 
INTRODUCTION 
1. 'The full video is available at http://www.cbsnews.com/news/welcome-to-hazle 
ton, accessed July 30, 2015. 
2. Compare this with Leo Chavez's observation that "since the Mexican-American 
War, immigration from Mexico and other Latin countries has waxed and waned, build-
ing in the early twentieth century, diminishing in the 19305, and building again [in] 
the post-1965 years. "These migrations paralleled those of other immigrant groups. But 
Mexicans in particular have been represented as the quintessential 'illegal aliens,' which 
distinguishes them from other immigrant groups. 'Their social identity has been plagued 
by the mark of illegality, which in much public discourse means that they are criminals 
and thus illegitimate members of society undeserving of social benefits, including citi-
zenship": Leo R. Chavez, The Latino Threat: Constructing Immigrants, Citizens, and the 
Nation (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), 3. 
3. A similar image is presented later in this broadcast. With the narrator describ-
ing the IIRA as "an ordinance that punishes businesses or landlords who give work or 
shelter to illegal aliens," we see the rear view of a person in a dark green jacket with the 
hood up walking down a sidewalk on a dark, rainy day. Chavez insightfully describes 
the significance of such depictions: 
Media spectacles transform immigrants' lives into virtual lives, which are typi-
cally devoid of the nuances and subtleties of real lived lives .... It is in this sense 
Notes to the Introduction 
that the media spectacle transforms a "worldview'" -that is, a taken-far-grant-
ed understanding of the world-into an objective force, one that is taken as 
"truth." In their coverage of immigration events, the media gave voice to com-
mentators, pundits, informed sources, and man-on-the-street observers who 
often invoke one or more of the myriad truths in the Latino Threat Narrative to 
support arguments and justify actions. In this way, media spectacles objectify 
Latinos. Through objectification (the process of turning a person into a thing) 
people are dehumanized, and onCe that is accomplished, it is easier to lack em-
pathy for those objects and to pass policies and laws to govern their behavior, 
limit their social integration, and obstruct their economic mobility. (ibid., 5~6) 
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4. To be sure, the telecast goes on to feature dissenting voices. Indeed, the story 
attracted attention because the national media considered it controversial; that element 
adds to the newsworthiness of the case. My point, however, is not simply that they pre-
sented only one side of the debate. Rather, following Chavez, I am pointing out that 
assumptions about race and place arc so taken-far-granted that even when journalists 
and others strive for objectivity, they employ problematic imagery. For example, on an 
episode of Lou Dobbs Tonight hosted live from Hazleton, Dobbs embraced the notion of 
a "'two-sided" debate while indiscriminately accepting the idea that "illegal immigra-
tion" is a crisis, saying, "Tonight, we're going to examine this community's efforts to deal 
with the harsh realities of illegal immigration. We will tell you about the facts of our 
national illegal immigration crisis. And we will have a vigorous and open debate, with 
all viewpoints represented, and some potential solutions to the crisis, with our audi-
ence here, with advocates on both sides of this issue": see "Broken Borders," Lou Dobbs 
Tonight, CNN, available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0705/02/ldL02. 
html, accessed December22, 2014. 
5. Chavez, The Latino Threat, 2 
6. Ibid. 
7. Recognizing the dehumanizing nature of referring to human beings as "illegaL" 1 
avoid using the phrase "illegal immigrant" (and variations thereof, such as "illegal alien") 
and refer instead to "people without documentation" or "undocumented" or "unauthor-
ized" immigrants, except when one of the phrases is part of a quotation or part of the 
rhetoric I am critically analYZing. Avia Chomsky, for example, notes that the phrase 
"illegal immigrant" has been condemned by the United Nations High Commission on 
Human Rights because "it contradicts the spirit and violates directly the words of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights which clearly states in Article 6 that '[eJveryone 
has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law'''; Avia Chomsky, "They 
Take Our Jobs!" and Twenty Other Myths about Immigration (Boston: Beacon, 2007), 58. 
Notably, the Associated Press has also changed its stylebook Lo avoid use of [·his term: 
see Lawrence Do·wnes, "No More 'Illegal Immigrants,'" New York Times, April 4, 2013. 
8. The introduction to the text version of the 60 Minutes telecast that 1 am analyzing 
here points out, "Not that long ago [illegal immigration] was a problem in a half dozen 
border states; today it impacts Virtually the entire country"; see http://www.cbsnews 
.com/news/welcome-to-hazleton. Lou Dobbs presented a similar angle in his "Broken 
Borders" episode, saying, "Hazleton is a small community nearly 2,000 miles from our 
southern border with Mexico. But, while it's far from our border, it's at the center of our 
illegal immigration and border security crisis." 
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Along these lines, my use of the word "seeps" and the phrase "stem the tide" here 
is an intentional attempt to describe the prevailing narrative. Otto Santa Ana power-
fully describes how frequently used metaphors of immigrants as "dangerous waters" 
contribute 10 the dehumanization of immigrants, writing, '''The major metaphor for 
the process of the movement of [al substantial number of human beings to the United 
States is characterized as IMMIGRATION AS DANGEROUS WATERS. .. The DANGEROUS 
WATERS metaphors do not refcr to any aspect of the humanity of the immigrants .. 
In contrast to such nonhuman metaphors for immigrants, U.S. SOciety is often referred 
to in human terms": Otto Santa Ana, Brown Tide Rising: Metaphors of Latinos in Con-
temporary American Public Discourse (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2002), 72-73. 
9. These concepts have their roots in Chavez's notion of the Latino Threat Narra-
tive, as well as in the work of other critical race, LatCdt, and immigration scholars. In 
addition to Chavez's The Latino Threat, I am especially influenced by the concepts of 
"white innocence" and "black abstraction" in Thomas Ross, "The Rhetorical Tapestry 
of Race: vVhite Innocence and Black Abstraction," William and Mary Law Review 32, 
no. 1 (1990): 1-36 (see Chapter 3). Lisa Marie Cacho's concept of the "ideology of White 
injury" has also helped me develop this framework: see Lisa Marie Cacho, '''The People 
of California Are Suffering': The Ideology of White Injury in Discourses of Immigra-
tion," Cultural Values 4 (2000): 389-418. Ian Haney Lopez's concepts of "dog whistle 
politics" and "strategic racism" also were instrumental to shaping my thinking: see Ian 
Haney Lopez, Dog Whistle Politics: How Coded Racial Appeals Have Reinvented Racism 
and Wrecked the Middle Class (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). Departing 
slightly from the concepts these scholars use, I employ the terms "degradation" and 
"affirmation" to dra-w attention to how the uplifting of one group and the demoting of 
another form the basis of divide and conquer politics. 
A few other notes on terminology: My focus in this book is on racialization-the 
(mostly top-down) process of attaching meanings to particular racial categories and the 
consequences thereof. Accordingly, as I use the term "Latina/o" throughout the text, I 
remain cognizant that it encompasses people from various ethnic and historical back-
grounds, as well as some who may also self-identify as White. For instance, Hazleton's 
recent immigranls arrived mostly from the Dominican Republic, Mexico, and Peru, but 
they also came from, among other Latin American countries, Ecuador, Colombia, Argen-
tina, Honduras, Guatemala, and Nicaragua: see "Ethnic Changes in Northeastern Penn-
sylvania: With Special Emphasis on Recent History within the City of Hazleton," Joint 
Urban Studies Center, July 2006, available at http://www,institutepa.org/pdf/research/ 
diversity0906.pdf, accessed July 29, 2015. However, in this context, the encompassing 
term is appropriate because it is used to explain a shared experience of racialization. 
This is also the reason I focus primarily on Latinas/os and Whites and not members 
of other ethnic! racial or immigrant groups who are also residents of Hazleton, albeit in 
much smaller numbers. >fbis is not to deny that other residents inhabit, experience, and 
shape the city; it has to do with how the debate I studied racialized these two groups in 
particular. 
The same applies to my use of the term "race" as opposed to "ethnicity." As Laura 
G6mez explains, race, as a socially constructed phenomenon, has "the quality of assign-
ment . .. > [Rlacial group membership is aSSigned by others, and particularly by members 
of the dominant group," Ethnicity, in contrast, has "the quality of assertion . .. , {EJthnic 
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group membership is chosen by members of the ethnic group, ... Used in this way, race 
involves harder, less voluntary group membership" (although, to be sure, undesirable 
racializations can be-and often are-contested): Laura Gomez, }y[anifest Destinies: The 
Making of the Mexican American Race (New York: New York University Press, 2007), 2. 
My use of the term "White" recognizes that "Whites [also] constitute a socially 
defined racial group, albeit with heterogeneous origins"-hence, my capitalization of 
the term: see Amy C. Steinbugler, Julie E. Press, and Janice Johnson Dias, "Gender, 
Race, and Affirmative Action: Operationalizing Intersectionality in Survey Research," 
Gender and Society 20 (2006): 822-823. Here, too, my focus is on the process whereby 
particular meanings are assigned to this particular racial category. The key difference, 
however, is that the raCial hierarchy enables Whites to be much more involved in the 
"assignment" process and that White racialization tends to draw links between \tVhite~ 
ness and characteristics that are widely understood as positive and that are articulated 
through the negative characteristics the dominant group often assigns to and associates 
with subordinated groups. Understood this way, we realize that a phrase such as "reverse 
racism" is actually a contradiction in terms. The tendency is often to equate "racism" 
with "prejudice," but when we take the history of race relations and the profound power 
differentials that linger today into account, we realize that these terms are distinct in that 
prejudice amounts to individual malice, whereas racism can be carried out only with the 
backing of institutional and cultural power structures. 
Note also that I write with the understanding that meaning is usually assigned to 
particular racial categories implicitly. For example, when I argue that the community 
"embraces a Vlhite identily," I am aware that very few people will explicitly state this. 
Indeed, many may not even be aware that this is what is happening. I make such inter~ 
pretations despite this, however, because what I have observed is a widespread embrace of 
the set of meanings attached to ·Whiteness (made possible by a parallel embrace of the set 
of meanings attached to, in this case, Latinas/os) that are constructed in the context of 
a racially charged debate. In this regard, I follow a chorus ofleading scholars who pOint 
out that, although overt racial degradation and affirmation may have become socially 
unacceptable after the Civil Rights Movement in the United States, this does not mean 
that public debates are now void of racialized communication. Especially when used 
in particular contexts and in particular ways, code words such as "illegal immigrant," 
"hardworking Americans," and "Small TO-INn, USA," are often laden with race and con-
jure either negative connotations about people of color or idyllic depictions of Whites. 
Again, even though the utterer of such phrases never mentions race per se and may deny 
that race had anything to do \vith the statement, I acknowledge in this book that we still 
communicate race by speaking in code and that doing so is highly consequential. For 
more on this, see Michelle Alexander, 'The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in an Age 
of Colorblind ness (New York: New Press, 2012); Derrick Bell, And We Are Not Saved: The 
Elusive Quest for Racial Justice (New York: Basic, 1989); Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, Racism 
without Racists: Color-Blind RaCism and the Persistence ofRaciaLInequality in America 
(Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006); Joe R. Feagin, Systemic Racism: A Theory 
of Oppression (New York: Routledge 2006); Tan HancyL6pez, "Post-racial Racism: Racial 
Stratification and Mass Incarceration in the Age of Obama," California Law Review 98 
(2010): 1023-1074; Michael Omi and Howard \Vinant, Racial Formation in the United 
States: From the 1960$ to the 1980s (New York: Routledge, 1986). 
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Another caveat: One of the aims of this book is to problematize both the negative 
radalization of Latina 51 os and the overwhelmingly positive racialization of \Vhites. In 
doing so, my intent in no way is to speak derogatively about individuals Of to deny 
that those who identify as vVhite are not "good people." Instead, I problernatize these 
racializations because I see them as socially harmful. Again, because positive White 
radalization is coherent only when juxtaposed with negative assertions about the racial 
"other," it Can have seriously detrimental implications. Similarly, when I problematize 
the "\Vhite injury" trope, my intent is not to say that White working-class people have 
not experienced any harm or endured any difficult social conditions. Quite the contrary: 
I wanl to emphasize that many are indeed going through some very difficult times. My 
point is that, contrary to dominant perceptions, the evidence overwhelmingly pOints to 
this being class-based as opposed to race-based harm. Thus, I see an embrace ofvVhite 
identity as harmful to poor and working-class White people, too-a group with whom 
I notably identify-because it keeps many of us from understanding our actual posi-
tion in the social structure. All of this is to say that I recognize that my use of the term 
"White" may catch some readers off-guard, especially given that vVhiteness is usually 
unacknowledged and "transparent": see Barbara Flagg, Was Blind, but Now I See: White 
Race Consciousness and the Law (New York: New York University Press, 1997). However, 
my sentiment is that it is important for those of us who are White to resist the inclina-
tion to recoil at critical analyses of racial ideology, because ultimately seeing and asking 
questions about White racialization is more socially productive for all of us. 
10. Pat Rubio-Goldsmith and colleagues, for example, have found that simply 
"appearing Mexican" was the best predictor of being mistreated by immigration authori-
ties: Pat Rubio-Goldsmith, Mary Romero, Raquel Rubio-Goldsmith, Manuel Escobedo, 
and Laura Khoury, "Ethno~Racial Profiling and State Violence in a Southwest Barrio," 
Aztlan: A Journal of Chicano Studies 34, no. 1 (2009): 93-123. See also, e.g., Mary Romero, 
"Racial Profiling and Immigration Law Enforcement: Rounding Up the Usual Suspects 
in the Latino Community," Critical Sociology 32, nos. 2-3 (2006): 447-473; Kevin R. 
Johnson, "'Aliens' and the U.S. Immigration Laws: The Social and Legal Construction of 
Nonpersons," University of Miami Inter-American Law Review 28 (1996): 269. 
11. Derrick Bell, as a comparable example, describes how Blacks lack "racial stand-
ing" to "discuss> .. negative experiences with racism" unless "publicly [disparaging] or 
[criticizing] other blacks "lNho are speaking or acting in ways that upset whites": Derrick 
Bell, Faces at the Bottom of the Well: The Permanence of Racism (New York: Basic, 1992), 
1ll,114, 
12. For example, research on the relationship between immigrants and crime con-
sistently shows that immigrants do not increase crime and may actually help reduce 
it: see, e.g., Matthew T. Lee and Ramiro Martinez Jr., "Immigration Reduces Crime; 
An Emerging Scholarly Consensus," SOCiology of Crime, Law and Deviance 13 (2009): 
3-16. Yet as Chapter 2 shows, undocumented immigrant criminality \'.'as presented 
as a "truth" through the course of this debate. Similarly, many claim that immigrants 
disproportionately use social services but do not contribute by paying taxes. 1his is 
untrue, a<; well. As Chomsky points out, "Immigrants, no matter what their status, 
pay the same taxes that citizens do-sales taxes, real estate taxes (if they rent or O'wn a 
home), gasoline taxes. Some immigrants work in the informal economy and are paid 
under the table in cash, so they don't have federal and state income taxes, or social 
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security taxes, deducted from their paychecks. So do some citizens. In fact every time 
the kid next door babysits, or shovels the snow, he or she is working in the informal 
economy": Chomsky, "They Take Our lobs!" 36. Even undocumented immigrants who 
work in the formal economy by presenting false Social Security numbers do pay Social 
Security taxes. In these instances, Chomsky continues, "The only ones who lose any-
thing when workers use a false social security number are the workers themselves. 
Taxes are deducted from their paychecks-but if they are undocumented, they still 
have no access to the benefits they are paying for, like social security or unemployment 
benefits": ibid., 37-38. 
13. Almost never, for example, does this narrative point to the various harms associ-
ated with living one's life, as Susan Bibler Coutin put it, "physically present but legally 
absent"; Susan Bibler Coutin, Nation of Emigrants: Shifting Boundaries of Citizerlship in 
El Salvador and the United States (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007), 9. The 
narrative also ignores the contributions undocumented immigrants make, including the 
production of those goods and services on ·which many in wealthy nations have come to 
rely. We also rarely see an acknowledgment of the complex nature of U.S. immigration 
iaw, including the challenges associated with gaining authorized presence, the various 
statuses that exist in between the simplistic legal-versus-illegal binary, and the histori-
cal antecedents to to day's laws, which clearly show that racial exclusion and economic 
exploitation have long been central prerogatives (see below). Similarly, the story is usu·· 
ally an individualistic one in which people make poor chokes in violating the la\\'. Rarely 
does the narrative consider the structural factors that prompt migration. 
14. As Joe Feagin notes in a historical overview of anti-immigrant nativism in the 
United States: 
Contemporary attacks on immigrants do not represent a new social phenom-
enon with no connection to past events. Anti-immigrant nativism in North 
America is at least two centuries old .... Historically, and on the present scene, 
nativists have stressed to varying degrees four major themes. One common 
complaint is that certain "races" are intellectually and culturally inferior and 
should not be allowed into the country, at least not in substantial numbers. 
Nativists have often regarded immigrant groups as racial "others" quite differ-
ent from the Euro-American majority. A second and related theme views lhose 
who have immigrated from racially and culturally inferior groups as problem-
atic in terms of their complete assimilation to the dominant Anglo culture. A 
third theme, articulated most often in troubled economic times, is that "infe-
rior" immigrants arc taking the jobs and disrupting the economic conditions 
of native-born Americans. A fourth notion, also heard most often in times of 
fiscal crisis, is that immigrants are creating serious government crises, such 
as by corrupting the voting system or overloading school and welfare systems. 
(Joe Feagin, "Old Poison in New Bottles: The Deep Roots of Modern Nativ-
ism," in Immigrants Out! The New Nativism and the Anti-immigrant Impulse 
in the United States, ed. Juan F. Perea [New York: New York University Press, 
1997], 13-14) 
15. Cacho, Social Death, 6. 
16. Chavez, The Latino Threat, 43. 
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17. Howard \Vinant, "Behind Blue Eyes: Whiteness and Contemporary U.S. Racial 
Politics," in Off White: Readings on Race, Powel; and Society, ed. Michelle Fine, LOis 
Weis, Linda C. Powell, and 1. MUll Wong (New York: Routledge, 1997),48. 
18. Chavez makes this point in the context of citizenship. He writes, "'The targeting 
of immigrants allows citizens to reaffirm their own subject status vis-a.-vis the immi-
grant Other": Chavez, The Latino Threat, 17. 
19. john a. powell, Racing to Justice: Transforming Our Conception of Self and Other 
to Build an Inclusive Society (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012), 53. 
20. It is here that the local nature of the Latino 1hrcat Narrative becomes perhaps 
most apparent. Chavez's analysis produced a similar set of binaries-for example, citi-
zen-noncitizen, native-foreigner, inside the nation-outside the nation-that articulated 
conceptions of "us" and "them" in the context of the nation rather than the city: see 
Chavez, The Latino Threat, 128. 
21. Cacho, "The People of California Are Suffering." 
22. Ibid., 393. As an illustration of this idea, consider the following example: When 
campaigning for president in 2012, Mitt Romney said, "My dad, as you probably know, 
was the governor of Michigan and was the head of a car company. But he 'vas born in 
Mexico. . and had he been born of Mexican parents, 1'd have a better shot at winning 
[the presidency]. But he was unfortunately born to Americans living in Mexico .... I 
mean, I say that jokingly, but it would be helpful to be Latino." Romney presents himself 
here as victimized because of his (White) race. Yet the reality is that-in addition to many 
other institutional disparities-when it comes to political representation, Latinas/os "are 
still grossly underrepresented in proportion to their population numbers," holding 3.3 
percent of all elected positions even though they make up 16 percent of the U.S. popula-
tion: see Vanessa Cardenas and Sophia Kerby, "'Ihe State of Latinos in the United States," 
Center for American Progress, Washington, DC, August 8, 2012, available at https:!! 
www.americanprogress.org/issues/race/report/2012/08/O 81 11984/ the-state- 0 f-la ti nos-
in-the-united-states, accessed May 26, 2014. 
23. To be sure, there are other lines of difference (e.g., gender, sexuality, and religion) 
along which divisions are forged. Arlene Stein, for example, provides an account of a 
local-level debate around religion and sexuality that emerges from a political economic 
context very similar to the one I describe here: Arlene Stein, The Stranger Next Door: The 
Story of a Small Community's Battle over Sex, Faith, and Civil Rights (Boston: Beacon, 
2012). 
24. See, e.g., Kitty Calavita, "'The New Politics of Immigration: 'Balanced Budget 
Conservatism' and the Symbolism of Proposition 187." Social Problems 43, no. 3 (1996): 
284-305; Kitty Calavita, "U.S. Immigration and Policy Responses: The Limits of Legisla-
tion," in Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective, ed. V\Tayne Cornelius, Takeyuki 
Tsuda, Philip Martin, and James Hollifield (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
2004),55-81. 
25. See, e.g., Roger Daniels, Coming to America: A History of Immigration and Eth-
nicity in American LIfe (New York: HarperCollins, 2002); Leobardo F. E<;trada, Chris 
Garcia, Reynaldo Flores Macis, and Lionel Maldonado, "Chicanos in the United States: 
A History of Exploitation and Resistance," Daedalu.s 110, no. 2 (1981): ]03-13l. 
26. As a 2013 report from the Pew Research Center points out: 
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The United States is the world's leader by far as a destination for immigrants. 
The country with the next largest number is Russia with 12.3 million. The U.S. 
total of 40.4 million, which includes legal as well as unauthorized immigrants, 
represents 13% of the total U.S. population in 2011. \,\Thile the foreign-born 
population size is a record, immigrants' share of the total population is below 
the U.S. peak of just under 15% during a previous immigration wave from 1890 
to 1920 that was dominated by arrivals from Europe. The modern 'wave, which 
began with the passage of border-opening legislation in 1965, has been domi-
nated by arrivals from Latin America (about 50%) and Asia (27%). ("A Nation of 
rmmigrants: A Portrait of the 40 Million, Including 11 Million Unauthorized," 
Pew Research Center, January 29,2013, available at http://w\vw.pewhispanic 
.org/2013/01l29/a-nation-of-immigrants, accessed December 22, 2014) 
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27. See Calavita, "The New Politics of Immigration"; Calavita, "U.S. Immigration 
and Policy Responses," 64; emphasis added. See also Kitty Calavita, Immigrants at the 
Margins: Law, Race, and Exclusion in Southern Europe (New York: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2005). 
28. Justin Akers Chacon and Mike Davis explain the situation in Mexico in the con~ 
text of, among other neoliberal developments, the implementation of the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); 
It is in the context of. >. roughshod capitalist development of Mexican agricul-
ture and its integration into the world market-primarily through its orienta-
tion toward the United States-that we must understand the establishment of 
patterns of cross-border migration. The subordination of Mexican capitalism 
to U.S. imperialism and the global institutions of neoliberalism set the stage 
for further economic convulsions. Out-migration serves as a release valve for 
the socially dislocated. This by~product was welcomed by a U.S. market eager 
to absorb not only Mexican imports, but also its reserve armies of labor, since 
migrants could be paid less and leveraged against unionized workers. (Justin 
Akers Chac6h and Mike Davis, No One Is Illegal: Fighting Racism and State 
l'iolence on the U.S.-Mexico Border [Chicago: Haymarket, 2006], 110) 
The story i.s similar in other Latin American countries, including the Dominican 
Republic. Chomsky writes: 
[The Dominican Republic] was colonized first by Spain, then by the United 
States. Clbe U.S. invaded and occupied the Dominican Republic from 1916 
to 1924 and again in 1965.) The first U.S. occupation brought about massive 
dispossession and transfer of Dominican land into lhe hands of U.S.-owned 
sugar plantations; the second brought about the modern version of colonialism 
... in which the governments of poor countries are forced to create low-wage, 
low··tax, low-regulation environments for the benefit of U.S. corporations .. 
The United States has the highest standard of living in the world, and it main-
tains it by using its laws, and its military, to enforce the extraction of resources 
and labor from its modern version of colonies, with little compensation for the 
populations. It is no wonder that people from these countries want to follow 
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their resources to the place where they are being enjoyed. (Chomsky, "They 
Take Our Jobs.'" 56) 
See also, e.g., Helen 1. Safa, "Women and Globalization: Lessons from the Dominican 
Republic," in The Spaces ofNeoliberalism: Land, Place and Family in LatinAmerica, ed. Jac-
quelyn Chase (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian, 2002),141-·158; Ronald 1. Mize and Grace Pena 
Delgado, Latino Immigrants in the United States (Malden, MA: Polity, 2012); David Bacon, 
The Right to Stay Home: How U.S. Policy Drives Mexican Migration (Boston: Beacon, 2014), 
29. Calavita is writing about Italy but makes a point with relevance to the contem-
porary global economy morc generally when she says, "Immigrants are useful to Italian 
employers precisely because they are different from locals. .. [T]heir lack of integration 
into Italian society and culture is a critical ingredient of their flexibility .... [Tlhey work 
for wages and under conditions that locals increasingly shun .... It is by dcfmition their 
Otherness that is useful": Calavita, Immigrants at the Margins, 64-65. 
30. Haney Lopez, Dog Whistle Politics, 47. He elaborates: 
For almost everyone, it is wrenching to encounter, let alone participate in, the 
level of intense suffering associated with driving persons from their homes or 
forcing people into bondage. If, however, we can convince ourselves that our 
victims are not like us-do not feel pain the way we do, are not intelligent 
and sensitive, indeed are indolent, degenerate, violent, and dangerous-then 
perhaps we're not doing so much harm after all; indeed, more than protecting 
ourselves, maybe we are helping the benighted others. And how much better, 
in terms of excusing our own self-interest, if it turns out that forces beyond 
anyone's control (and hence beyond our moral responsibility) doom these un-
fortunate others to subservience; if, say, God or nature [or law] fixed their insu-
perable character and determined their lot in life. 
31. vVhat 1 am describing here is consistent with the critical race theory notion of 
differential racialization: "At one point, fOf example, society may have had little use for 
blacks but much need for Mexican Of Japanese agricultural workers. At another time, 
the Japanese, including citizens oflong standing, may have been in intense disfavor and 
removed to war relocation camps, while society cultivated other groups of COIOf for jobs 
in waf industry or as cannon fodder on the front" (Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, 
Critical Race Theory: An Introduction [New York: New York University Press, 2012], 9). 
32. Nicholas P. De Genova, "Migrant 'Illegality' and Deportability in Everyday Life," 
Annual Review of Anthropology 31 (2002): 438. 
33. Romero, "Racial Profiling and Immigration Law Enforcement," 468. 
34. Calavita, Immigrants at the Margins, 154. 
35. As Calavita notes, "'The structural tram formations in the economy that repro-
duce a continued demand for immigrants at the same time contribute to restrictionist 
sentiment": Calavita, "U.S. Immigration and Policy Responses," 64. In an informative 
journalistic piece, Saket Soni Similarly calls immigrant workers "the canaries in the coal 
mine," experiencing the negative effects of contingent labor as it gradually becomes the 
norm in the United States: 
Immigrant workers have long experienced vulnerability and instability, and 
have long been treated as disposable by their employers. Today, roughly one-
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third of American jobs are part-time, contract or otherwise "contingent." And 
the number of contingent workers in the United States is expected to gro\v 
by more than one-third over the next four years. That means more and more 
families are without the benefits of full-time work, such as health insurance, 
pensions or 401(k)s. And more of us are without the employment certainty that 
leads to economic stability at home-and to the consumer spending that drives 
the economy. 
In addition, \vhile we are working harder and longer, wages are stagnant. 
Between 2000 and 2011, the US economy grew by more than 18 percent, while 
the median income for working families declined by 12.4 percent. Once upon 
a time, workers shared the economic prosperity of their employers: until 1975, 
wages accounted for more lhan 50 percent of America's GDP. But by 2013, wages 
had fallen to a record low of just 43.5 percent of GDP. Overall compensation, 
which factors in healthcare and other benefits has also hit bottom. Immigrants 
know where this downward spiral1eads. (Saket Soni, "Low-Wage Nation," The 
Nation, January 20, 2014, 4) 
123 
36. Hazleton's unemployment rate has also been conSistently high compared -.,.dth 
Pennsylvania's. For example, during the summer that the IIRA was passed (August 
2006), Hazleton's unemployment rate was 6.6 percent, whereas Pennsylvania's was 4.6 
percent. The median income in Hazleton, as of 2012, was $31,295, which is also below 
the state and national median. And like many cities across the United States, Hazleton 
has struggled with budgetary issues that have led the city to consider the sale of public 
utilities to private companies: see, e.g., David P. Sosar, "Water Authority for Sale: Dis-
advantages of Selling City Assets to Purge Budgetary Deficits," International Journal of 
Humanities and Social Science 1, no. 18 (2011): 134-142. 
37. See, e.g., Jill Weigt, "Compromises to Careworlc 'The Social Organization of 
Mothers' Experiences in the Low-Wage Labor Market after Welfare Reform," Social 
Problems 53, no. 3 (2006): 322-351. 
38. Sociologists have long understood that communities strongly reassert their col-
lective identities at moments of uncertainty, especially when the dominant group feels 
threatened by the combination of demographic change and economic decline. For a 
particularly relevant example of this, see David Engel, "The Oven Bird's Song: Insiders, 
Outsiders, and Personal Injuries in an American Community," Law and Society Review 
18, no. 4 (1984): 551-582. 
39. Haney Lopez, Dog Whistle Politics, 35-37. 
40. See, e.g., Katherine Beckett, Making Crime Pay: Law and Order in Contemporaty 
American Politics (New York: Oxford University Press), 1997,40-42. 
41. Haney Lopez, Dog Whistle Politics, 12L 
42. Michael Powell and Michelle Garda, "Pa. City Put Illegal Immigrants on 
Notice," Washington Post, August 22, 2006. 
43. Haney L6pez prOVides an overview of the history of this tactic and its present 
usage, writing: 
The new racial politics presents itself as steadfastly opposed to racism and ever 
ready to condemn those who publicly use racial profanity. We fiercely oppose 
racism and stand prepared to repudiate anyone who dares utter the n~word. 
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Meanwhile, though, the new racial discourse keeps up a steady drumbeat of 
subliminal racial grievances and appeals to color~coded solidarity. But let's be 
honest: some groups commit more crimes and use more welfare, other groups are 
mainly unskilled and illiterate illegals, and some religions inspire violence and 
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to poor whites in an effort to drive a wedge between them and black slaves. 
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fully planned and slowly evolved method, which drove such a wedge between 
the while and the black workers that there probably are not today in the world 
two groups of workers with practically identical interests who hate and fear 
each other so deeply and persistently and who are kept so far apart that neither 
sees anything of common interest. (W.E.B. Du Bois, Black Reconstruction in 
America [New York: Meridian, 1935], 700) 
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46. Du Bois elaborates: 
It must be remembered that the white group of laborers, while they received a 
low wage, 'were compensated in part by a sort of public and psychological wage. 
They were given public deference and titles of courtesy because they were white. 
1ney were admitted freely with all classes of white people to public functions, 
public parks, and the best schools. The police were drawn from their ranks, and 
the courts, dependent upon their votes, treated them with such leniency as to 
encourage lawlessness. Their vote selected public officials, and while this had 
small effect upon the economic situation, it had great effect upon their personal 
treatment and the deference shown to them. (ibid" 700-701) 
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(in hiring, university admissions, federal contracting, etc.), Assaults on these 
policies ... are currently at hysterical levels. These attacks are clearly designed 
to effect ideological shifts, rather than to shift resources in any meaningful 
way. They represent whiteness as disadvantage, something which has few prec-
edents in US racial history .... This imaginary white disadvantage-for which 
there is almost no evidence at the empirical level-has achieved widespread 
popular credence, and provides the cultural and political "glue" that holds 
together a wide variety of reactionary racial politics. (Winant, "Behind Blue 
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mers, "Whites See Racism as a Zero-Sum Game that 1hey Are Now Losing," Perspectives 
on Psychological Science 6, no. 3 (2011): 215-218. Vve also commonly see an example of 
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CHAPTER 1 
1. Personal interview with W. Kevin O'Donnell, preSident of CAN DO, December 
3,2009, Hazleton, PA. In contrast to other interviews and in accordance with accepted 
research protocols, I use O'Donnell's real name because of his status as a public figure 
(Le., the head of Hazleton's primary economic development group). 
2. Community Area New Development Organization (CAN DO), The CAN DO 
Story: A Case History of Successful Community Industrial Development (Hazleton, PA: 
CAN DO, 1974). In the introduction of the chapter, I intentionally draw mostly from 
CAN DO's organizational recollection of these historical events. 
3. CAN DO, The CAN DO Story, 7. 
4. Quoted from CAN DO, Vision, Determination, Drive: The CAN DO 50th Anni-
versary, DVD, on file with the author. 
5. Randy Stoecker, "The CDC Model of Urban Redevelopment: A Critique and an 
Alternative." Journal of Urban Affairs 19, no. 1 (1997): 8. To be sure, as Stoecker contin-
ues, the basis for the CDC idea, even in the beginning, was "an acceptance of supply-side 
economic models and "free-market" philosophy:' The point was not to counter capital-
ism but, rather, to "correct three market failures: 1) The inability of potential investors 
to see opportunities in the neighborhood; 2) profit maximization that prevented socially 
conscious investing; 3) sociaillegal restrictions on investment such as zoning laws." In 
the case of Hazleton, as Dan Rose argues in his thorough analysis of CAN DO's history, 
these early local campaigns tended to overemphasize the grassroots nature of the move-
ment, neglecting the extent to which it was led by elites: see Dan Rose, Energy Transi-
